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IN 
The Supreme Court 
OF THE 
State of Utah 
CLARABELL KELLEY, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE TRANSPORTATION 
CO:J[p ~\XY, a corporation, and 
GREE~ CAB TRAXSPORTA-
TIOX CO:JIP A~Y, a corporation, 
and LE\YIS BARTLEY, 
Defendants and Appellants 
Case No. 6329 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS 
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff complained that on the lOth day of Feb-
ruary, 1940, she employed a taxicab owned and driven 
by the defendants to transport her and her infant son 
from the :Medical Arts Building on South Temple Street 
in Salt Lake City, to her home at 921 'Vest Third ~ orth 
Street, in said city, for which service she paid the regu-
lar fare; that the driver proceeded west on South Tem-
ple Street from the Medical Arts Building in a careless 
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and negligent manner and particularly that he oper-
ated hif cab at a high and excessive rate of speed, to-wit, 
in excess of 35 miles an hour, and that as said cab ap. 
proached the intersection of South Temple and First 
\Vest Streets, it was traveling at such excessive rate of 
speed; that the driver failed to keep a proper lookout for 
traffic upon South Temple and First West Streets, and 
particul::uly over the intersection thereof, and failed to 
retard his speed as he approached the intersection so 
that he might stop if an emergency arose; that as the cab 
entered the intersection of South Temple and First \Vest 
Streets, another automobile traveling across the inter-
section traversed said intersection immediately in front 
of said taxicab; that in order for said defendant Bartley 
to avoid a collision with said other automobile, it became 
necessary for him to suddenly apply his breaks, which 
he did without warning, throwing the plaintiff from the 
rear seat against the back of the front seat and into the 
bottom of the cab, by reason whereof she sustained the 
injuries of which she complains, to-wit, bruises and con-
tusions of the arms and legs, a severe twist and wrench 
of her back, excruciating pain and nervous shock. 
The answer of the defendants denied negligence and 
also denied any damage whatsoever to the plaintiff, and 
alleged as a special and affirmative defense that shortly 
after February 10, 1940, the plaintiff asserted to the de-
fendants that she had suffered injuries because of an 
accident which occurred on that date, and asserted that 
the accident occurred because of some fault on the part 
of defendants' driver; that the defendants at said time 
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denied that there had been any negligence, and denied 
that there was any responsibility, but nevertheless, in 
order to fully compose and settle the dispute and to dis-
charge any possible claims that the plaintiff might have 
against the defendants, on February 21, 1940, paid to the 
plaintiff the sum of $20.00, of which sum the plaintiff 
acknowledged receipt in writing, and in consideration 
thereof, released and forever discharged the defendants, 
and each of them, from all claims, damages and rights 
of action of every kind and character growing out of the 
incident complained of. 
In reply the plaintiff admitted that on February 21, 
1940, the defendants tendered to her the sum of $20.00, 
but denied that she released and discharged the defend-
ants. She admits in her reply (Tr. 12-14, Ab. 11) that 
she signed the release, but alleges that her signature 
thereto was procured by misrepresentation and fraud, 
and alleges that the misrepresentation and fraud con-
sisted of agents of the defendants stating to her that 
she would not be able to recover any damage against 
them by reason of her injuries, and that 1mless she signed 
the release, they would pay her no sums for her injuries, 
nor would they pay the doctor bHl for services rendered 
or to be rendered to her, nor would they pay any further 
expense of any kind, and that it was by reason of such 
mis-statements made by agents of the defendants that 
she signed the paper, which she did without knowing the 
contents thereof, by reason of which facts the plaintiff 
claims that she is not bound by the release. 
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II. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The r~~ets material to a decision of the cause are as 
follows: 
On February 10, 1940, the plaintiff had taken her 
young son to the Medical Arts Building to have some 
teeth extracted. (Tr. 47, Ab. 14.) When the boy was 
able to leave, she called a cab and went downstairs and 
waited unt:I the cab came for her. She and the child got 
in to the cab, \Yhich turned in the intersection between 
:\lain and State Streets, and started west on South Tem-
ple. The cab was traveling at a rate of 20 to 22 miles per 
hour. (Tl'. 102, Ab. 27.) As the cab approached the 
intersection of First \Vest and South Temple Streets 
(Tr. 101, Ab. 26) there vv-ere two cars stopped waiting 
to go through. The driver slackened his speed until he 
got within about 30 feet of the cars in front of him, when 
they went on through. lie followed them. He looked to 
the left and it was clear as far as he could see, and he 
looked to the right, and it was clear. As he proceeded 
through, however, a car fron1 the left came up in front of 
him going about 40 miles an hour. He could see that he 
couldn't get through, so he put on the brakes and stopped. 
Mrs. Kelley (Tr. 48-9, Ab. 14) saw the car dash in 
front of them, but she couldn't see which car it was. 
She testified (Tr. 47, Ab. 14) that at the time the cab en-
tered the intersection it was going 25 to 30 miles an 
hour; that when the brakes were put on, she was thrown 
off the seat and against the back of the front seat. There 
is no dispute about the fact that the brakes were put on, 
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and that the rab stopped quite suddenly. The plaintiff 
testified (Tr. 49, Ab. 15) that she got in touch with Mr. 
Boynton of the cab company and told him of the accident; 
that he asked her if she knew Dr. Landenburger or Dr. 
Ross Anderson or Dr. Spencer "\Vright, to which she said 
no; that ~Ir. Boynton sent her to Dr. Wright on the af-
ternoon of February 13, 1940, and that he made an ex-
amination of her. Dr. \Yright testified (Tr. 88, Ab. 23) 
that :Jirs. Kelley came to his office on February 13th or 
14th, 1940, and that he examined her; that she complained 
of pain in the lumbar region of her back; that she was 
thoroughly examined and it was found that she had some 
sore muscles ; that there ·were no other injuries and her 
injury could only be determined by her complaint of pain; 
that there was no evidence on the skin of any bruising 
or injury; that (Tr. 89) no X-ray was advisable; that 
he gave her an electrical treatment, strapped up her back 
to support the muscles; that he had a number of tele-
phone conversations with her and examined her again 
after an interval of possibly two days, and discovered the 
same condition as reported before. That he would ex-
pect the condition he found to heal itself in a week or 
two; that she appeared to be an extremely nervous type 
of person, and that that condition had existed for some 
6me; that it was not caused by the accident. 
Dr. Howard T. Anderson, a witness produced on be-
half of plaintiff, testified (Tr. 74, Ab. 20) that the plain-
Eff came to him about the last of February, 1940, for an 
X-ray examination; that he took an X-ray ·which showed 
no bony injury to any of the parts of the body com-
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plained about, and that no bony injury was discernible 
in thu X-ray, that a few days later, he examined her at 
her hon1e, and that she complained of tenderness in the 
back and the lumbar region, and he told her that he 
thought her injury was a mild sacro strain of the back 
muscles, and that the treatment should be rest, with heat 
applied; that she told him she had been thrown against 
the seat of a cab (Tr. 75, Ab. 21) and since that time, 
she had had pain in her back; that that could have caused 
her injury. 
Ruby 0 'l{eefe, a witness called on behalf of the 
plain tiff, testified ( Tr. 78, _A_ b. 21) that she went to the 
plaintiff's hon1e during February, 1940, and rendered 
services there; that on the 14th of February, 1940, when 
she arrived, Mrs. Kelley was in bed, and that during the 
week she stayed there, Mrs. Kelley remained in bed, and 
that Mrs. Kelley had agreed to pay her $1.00 a day. 
Mrs. Kelley testified (Tr. 50, Ab. 15) that after she 
had been examined by Dr. Wright, she had a nervous 
chill and went home, and went to bed; that the Relief 
Society teachers came in and got her extra help, which 
she had to pay for; that (Tr. 51) she is indebted to Miss 
O'Keefe for $7.00; that the other lady who came in was 
there three days, and she owes her $1.00 a day for each 
day. That (Tr. 54, Ab. 1'6) she has not recovered, and 
her back still bothers her if she does extra hard work or 
much lifting or walking. 
The above statement covers in general the evidence 
relating to the circumstances and nature of the injury 
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complained of. \Ve shall now direct our attention to a 
consideration of the release pleaded in defendants' an-
swer and introduced in evidence as defendants' Exhibit 
1. That document reads as follows: 
''RELEASE 
''For the sole consideration of Twenty 
($20.00) and XOjlOOths DOLLARS and other val-
uableuable considerations, the receipt of which is 
hereby acknowledged, I do hereby release and for-
eYer discharge the Salt Lake Transportation Com-
pany. the Green Cab Transportation Company 
and Louis Bartley, Cab Driver, from all claims, 
demands and rights of action of any kind what-
soever, which I now have or can have on account 
of injury to person or damage to property ·or ex-
penses or loss of services sustained by me, or 
which may hereafter arise, in consequence of an 
accident which occurred on or about the tenth day 
of February, 1940, at the intersection of South 
Temple and First West Streets, Salt Lake City, 
Utah. 
''It is agreed that the payment of the above 
sum and other valuable considerations is not to 
be construed as an admission by or on behalf of 
the above named parties of any liability on ac-
count of said accident. 
"Executed at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 21st 
day of February, 1940. 
~fRs. CLARABELL UTLEY K_ELLEY ( Sgd.) 
~fRS. 1L \V. ALLRED ( Sgd.) 
\Vitness'' 
The plaintiff admitted (Tr. 61, Ab. 17) that the sig-
nature ''Clara bell Utley l{elley'' thereon is her signa-
hue; that she signed it in the presence of l\Ir.c.:. Allred) 
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the witness thereto, on the 21st day of February, 1940; 
that when she signed it, she received $20.00 in cash. In 
addition to this (Tr. 60, Ah. 17) she was to be entitled to 
choose her own doctor and the defendant companies 
would pay for it; that (Tr. 62, Ab. 17) both Dr. Reese 
and Dr. Anderson were doctors of her own choosing. The 
plaintiff testified (Tr. 63, Ab. 17) that it was a week or 
longer after she was injured that Mr. Boynton and the 
other gentleman came to her house; that she was hurting 
all over and her back was bothering her, and she was 
sick and nervous when they came; that they told her they 
would allow her $20.00 for help that she told them she 
was entitled to more than that; (Tr. 64, Ab. 18) that she 
had already called her attorney, Mr. Shields, and Mr. 
Boynton told her it didn't matter whether she employed 
an attorney or not, and that if she didn't take the $20.00, 
she 1.vould get nothing at all. They asked her if she had 
employed an attorney, and she said, "'Veil, they had dis-
cussed an attorney." That they told her she would get 
no more medical attention unless she signed the release, 
and she signed it on that representation; that the fol-
lowing day she got in touch with her attorney, and that 
she gave the $20.00 to her attorney, Roy Shields. (Tr. 
6'6.) 
It was then stipulated that the plaintiff, or her attor-
ney, got a check and tendered it back to the Salt Lake 
Transportation Company and Green Cab Company, and 
that the check has been tendered back to the plaintiff. 
Mrs. Kelley further testified that her brother was pres-
ent when she consented to the settlement (Tr. 70, Ab. 
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19); that he was 49 years of age at the time of the settle-
ment; that at the time the settlement \vas discussed, 
Mr. Boynton did not have the release or the money pres-
ent (Tr. 71); that another gentleman came out subse-
quently on the same day with the release and the money, 
and that she signed the release in the presence of Mrs. 
Allred, who acted as a witness. 
:Jlr. Charles A. Boynton, a witness called on behalf 
of the defendants, testified (Tr. 117, Ab. 29) that he and 
Harold S. Jennings went to the residence of l\irs. Kel-
ley; that :Jlr. Utley was there, and Mrs. Kelley was in 
bed; that they went out (Tr. 116, Ab. 18) as a result 
of a call from :Mr. George Utley, the brother of plaintiff, 
and her Dr. Byron Reese; that Mr. Utley (Tr. 118, Ab. 
30) appeared to be a man of sound health and mind; 
that ~Irs. Kelley consulted Mr. Utley as to what she 
should do; that :Mr. Utley expressed the opinion that 
Mrs. Kelley should take what was offered; that this was 
on the 21st day of February, 1940, (Tr. 119); that Mrs. 
Kelley was told that the defendants would pay her 
$20.00 and all doctor bills that had been incurred, and 
that they would pay any doctor bills as long as she was 
under treatment of Dr. Wright, if she would go to him 
and take treatments until he released her; that she said, 
"\Vell, all right," and later on the same day, signed the 
release; that the sum of $20.00 was fixed, and she was 
paid that amount to cover the cost of her household help; 
that the $20.00 was given her in currency (Tr. 120) and 
that the defendants later received back a cashier's check 
"Tith the letter markc>cl Exhibit A from Attorney Shields; 
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that the defendants have never accepted the return of the 
money, and have tendered it back for the benefit of the 
plaintiff. That Mrs. Kelley made a statement that she 
saw no use of getting an attorney, in no way indicating 
to Mr. Boynton that an attorney was employed (Tr.l21); 
that she did not mention the name of Mr. Shields; that 
he, Mr. Boynton, expressed the idea that the driver had 
used due care, and that the defendants were not liable 
for any claims she might present; that (Tr. 123, Ab. 31) 
he took Mr. Jennings out with him so that he would be 
present during the conversation and be able to be a wit-
ness; that on the day the release was signed, Mr. Utley 
called and said that they were ready to talk settlement; 
that the defendants were interested in making a settle-
ment to save legal expense, and ·went out purposely and 
took Mr. Jennings with him to make a settlement; that 
(Tr. 126) they told plaintiff they were willing to pay her 
$20.00 and the doctor bills, and other medical treatment, 
and they didn't consider themselves liable for anything; 
that Mrs. Kelley said she ought to have something for 
her injury, and Mr. Boynton said that they were paying 
her $20.00 because of the fact that they wanted to take 
care of her, although they didn't feel that they were 
liable (Tr. 127); that he didn't say she could get nothing 
more, and she said nothing about an attorney; that he 
told her they would authorize no further medical serv-
ice until a basis of complete understanding could be ar-
rived at: that the offer to pay the doctors' services was 
conditional upon her signing the release (Tr. 128, Ab. 32) 
and that if she hadn't signed the release, there would 
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have been no further medical services, so far as the 
defendants were concerned; that the proposition dis-
cussed with ~Irs. I~elley in consideration of which the 
release ·was signed, was not only the $20.00, but the pay-
ment of all past doctor bills and future medical service. 
Harold S. Jennings testified ( Tr. 131, A b. 32) to the 
same effect as ~Ir. Boynton. 
Clyde H. Day, a witness, called on behalf of the de-
fendants, testified that he took the release and the 
$20.00 out; that the release was signed by Mrs. Kelley 
in his presence and in the presence of Mrs. Allred, and 
that he left the $20.00 with Mrs. Kelley, and that she 
said (Tr. 133, Ab. 33) "\Vell, that is the terms :Mr. Boyn~ 
ton and I agreed upon. We thought it best to agree 
upon a settlement. \Ve have always been users of taxi-
cabs, and we will have to continue to use them in the 
future.'' 
Clarabell Kelley, called In rebuttal, said (Tr. 136, 
A b. 34), that she did not say to the witness Day that 
she had agreed to a friendly settlement with Mr. Boyn-
ton ; that he brought the release in to the bedroom and 
said, "You can sign it here Mrs. Kelley"; that there 
was a book to write on on the bed, and she put the paper 
on the book and signed it. 
DI. A STATEMENT OF THE ERRORS RELIED 
UPON FOR REVERSAL 
Defendants and appellants contend: 
1. That the court erred in denying rlefendants' 
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motion for a non-suit in that: 
(a) The evidence was insufficient to sustain 
or justify a verdict in favor of plaintiff and against 
the defendants in that: 
1. There was no showing of any negligence 
on the part of the defendants, nor any of them. 
2. There was no pleading nor any evidence 
sufficient to avoid the effect of the release (Ex-
hibit 1), executed bye the plaintiff in favor of the 
defendants. 
2. That the Court erred in refusing and in failing 
to grant defendants' motion for a directed verdict. 
3. That the Court erred in giving its Instruction 
No. 2 in this, that there was no dispute in the evidence 
as to the circumstances under which the release (Exhibit 
1) was procured, nor as to whether or not it was volun-
tary, the evidence conclusively showing that said release 
was voluntary, nor was there any allegation or proof of 
any fact sufficient in law to avoid the effect of such re-
lease, and therefore no evidence whatever to justify the 
giving of said Instruction No. 2. 
4. That the Court erred in its refusal to give de-
fendants' requested Instruction No. 2. 
5. That the Court erred in its refusal to give de-
fendants' requested Instruction No. 3. 
6. That the Court erred in its refusal to give de-
fendants' requested Instruction No. 4. 
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7. That the Court erred in its refusal to give de-
fendants' requested Instruction No. 5. 
8. That the Court erred in its refusal to give de-
fendants' requested Instruction No. 6. 
9. That the Court erred in denying and failing to 
grant defendants' motion for a new trial, for the reason 
E!et forth under assignments of error Nos. 1 and 2 hereof. 
IV. A STATEMENT OF THE PARTICULAR 
QUESTIONS INVOLVED FOR 
DETERMINATION 
The particular questions involved for determination 
are these: 
1. Is the evidence sufficient to justify or sustain a 
verdict in fayor of the plaintiff and_ against the defend-
ants on the question of negligence~ 
2. "\Y ere the pleadings or evidence sufficient to 
avoid the effect of the release executed by plaintiff in 
favor of the defendants~ 
3. Did the Court err in giving instructions, or in 
refusing to give requested instructions, in the following 
particulars : 
(a) Did the Court err in giving its instruc-
tion No.2~ 
(b)Did the Court err in refusing to give de-
fendants' requested Instructions Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5 and 
6, or any of them~ 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
14 
V. BRIEF OF THE ARGUMENT 
1. The evidence is not sufficient to sustain a verdict 
in favor of the plaintiff and against the defend-
ants on the question of negligence. 
The acts of negligence alleged by plaintiff in her 
complaint are as follows (Tr. 2, Ab. 3): 
(a) Excessive speed, to-wit, in excess of 35 
miles per hour ; 
(b) Failure to keep proper lookout for traf-
fie; 
(c) Failure to keep the cab under proper, or 
any, control; 
(d) Failure to retard speed as the cab ap-
proached the intersection; 
(e) Applying brakes without any warning. 
The only direct evidence in support of any of these 
contentions was that offered by the plaintiff in her own 
behalf. She testified (Tr. 47, Ab. 14) that she got into 
the cab in front of the Medical Arts Building; that the 
cab turned in the intersection between Main and State 
Streets, and started west on South 'remple, ''and there 
were no stops. He went directly right through to First 
West.'' 
'' Q. You say there were no stops. What do 
you mean by that~ 
"A. He didn't have to wait for the light. 
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"Q. In other words, he had the green light 1 
''A. Yes. 
"Q. All right." 
Plaintiff testified that the car was going about 25 or 30 
miles an hour when it reached the intersection of First 
"\Yest, and that the brakes were suddenly applied and the 
car stopped with a jerk, and threw her against the front 
seat, and back down into the bottom of the car; that (Tr. 
48, Ab. 14) plaintiff said to the driver, "This is a fine 
place for Ine to be, down in the bottom of the cab.'' He 
said, "Well, if you had been looking, you could have 
braced yourself. We almost had a collision with another 
car. '' That ' 'there was a car that dashed right by, as 
quick as he applied the brakes-he applied the brakes 
and stopped." 
"Q. Yon saw the car did you'? 
"A. Yes." 
On cross examination (Tr. 55, Ab. 16) Mrs. Kelley 
repeated that the cab was traveling between 25 and 30 
miles an hour, but said that she had never driven a car, 
and that (Tr. 56) the car that came in front of the cab 
was going faster than the cab. 
The only other evidence relating to the circumstance~ 
under which the accident occurred was given by the de-
fendant Bartley (Tr. 100-111, Ab. 26-28). Bartley tes· 
tified t::at he was the driver of the cab involved; that hi.' 
picked up ~r r~. Kelley and her child at the Medical Arts 
Building (Tr. 101, Ab. 26); that he made a U-turn in 
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front of the Medical Arts Building, and proceeded west; 
that as he approached First West and South Temple, 
there were two cars stopped waiting for the traffic to 
go north, so he slowed up; that as he got within 30 feet 
of these two cars, they went on through, so he proceeded 
to follow them; that he looked to the left, and it was clear 
as far as he could see ; that he looked to the right and it 
was clear, and then he glanced to the left again, when 
another car came up in front of him, going about 40 miles 
an hour; that he put on the brakes and stopped and that 
Mrs. Kelley was thrown to the bottom of the cab; that 
(Tr. 102, Ah. 27) when he entered the intersection he was 
going between 20 and 22 miles an hour; that he did not 
have room to clear the car approaching from the south by 
going on through. On cross-examination (Tr. 104, Ab. 
27) he confirmed his direct testimony as to his speed. He 
testified that (Tr. 106) as he approached First West he 
had slowed up, preparing to stop, and that he looked both 
to the left and the right, and that (Tr. 107, Ab. 27) he 
thought the car which dashed in front of him was going 
about 40 miles an hour; that (Tr. 110, Ab. 28) he techni-
cally had the right of way, but does not think he could 
have gone on through in front of the car approaching 
from the south; that he had no time to give Mrs. Kelley 
any warning that he was going to stop, and that (Tr. 
111) the circumstances required him to put the brakes 
on to stop to avoid a collision. 
·The burden was on the plaintiff to prove actionable 
negligence occasioning the injuries about which she com-
plained. There is no inference of negligence from the 
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fact that the plaintiff fell off the seat. 
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitwr does not apply for 
two reasons: first, because it was not pleaded nor relied 
on by the plaintiff, and our court has held (Laos v. Moun-
tain Fuel Supply Company, ______ Utah ______ , 108 Pac. 2d 
:254, at page :259) that: 
'' * * * \Y e think one who wishes to rely 
on that doctrine, as well as specifically assigned 
acts of negligence, must so plead, either by a sep-
arate count or by proper allegation to the effect 
that the negligence to be inferred from the gen-
eral situation caused the injury, thereby notifying 
the other party that he intends to rely on the doc-
trine of res ipsa loquitur. To set out by way of 
inducement a situation which itself may bespeak 
a prima facie case of negligence and then follow 
with allegations of specific negligence and allege 
that by 'reason of such negligent acts and omis-
sions on the part of the defendant (referring to 
those specifically alleged) the plaintiff was in-
jured,' etc., does not sufficiently put the defendant 
on notice that the plaintiff is going to rely on the 
situation itself to furnish any inference of negli-
gence.'' 
and, secondly, because in a case like this, where another 
instrumentality, to-wit, another automobile going in a 
different direction, contributed to the necessity for stop-
ping, and where other facilities involved were not under 
the control of the defendants, the doctrine of re.s ipsa 
lorruilur is inapplicable. Yellow Cab v. Hodgson, et al. 
(Colo.), 14 Pac. 2d 1081. In that case, the decisions are 
carefully reviewed, and the Court finally comes to the fol-
lowing conclusion, page 1085: 
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'' * * * The evidence clearly established 
that the injury may have resulted by reason of the 
concurrent negligence of two or more persons or 
causes, not both under the management and con-
trol of defendant, and therefore the doctrine of 
res ipsa loquitur was inapplicable." 
As to the acts of negligence pleaded by plaintiff, we 
are drawn to the following inevitable conclusions: 
(a) Excessive speed. There is no evidence in sup-
port of this allegation. There is no state law making a 
speed of 25 to 30 miles an hour unlawful or negligent. 
No city ordinance was pleaded nor relied on relating to 
rate of speed. There is no presumption that 30 miles 
an hour is an excessive or careless rate of speed, and the 
mere occurrence of the accident is no evidence of negli-
gence. 
(b) Failure to keep a proper lookout for traffic. 
The evidence on this point is uncontradicted and conclu-
sive. The defendant Bartley testified (Tr. 101, Ab. 26) 
that he looked both right and left, notwithstanding that 
he already had the right of way, and two cars had pro-
ceeded through the intersection before him, and that he 
did not see the car coming until there was nothing to do 
but put on his brakes and stop. There is a presumption 
of due care and not of negligence. The plaintiff also tes-
tified that she saw the car, but only just as it dashed in 
front of the cab. The circumstances would indicate that 
the defendant Bartley is more to be complimented for 
avoiding an actual collision and serious injury to the 
plaintiff, than to be charged with negligence. 
(c) Failure to keep the cab under proper or any 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1 9 
control. The evidence under this heading is conclusive 
in favor of the defendants. The uncontradicted evidence 
is (Tr. 101, ..c\b. 26) that the cab slowed down as it ap-
proached the intersection, and that the defendant was 
able by alertness and by having control, to stop the cab 
and aYoid the collision. 
(d) Failure to retard speed of the cab as it a p-
proached the intersection. The only evidence on this 
point is that of the defendant Bartley (Tr. 101, Ah. 26) 
that the speed \Yas retarded as the intersection was ap-
proached. 
(e) Applying the brakes without warning. The 
uncontradicted evidence is that there was no opportunity 
to give warning to the plaintiff (Tr. 110, Ab. 28). No 
warning was therefore required. The cab driver was not 
thrown from his seat, and undoubtedly if the plaintiff 
had to any extent been looking out for her own safety, 
she would not have been unseated. Moreover, had the 
driver delayed to give her warning, it is quite likely that 
a collision with the car approaching from the left would 
have resulted. 
The plaintiff has wholly failed to discharged the bur-
den imposed upon her of proving negligence. 
2. There ,vere no pleadings, nor '\11/as any evidence 
introduced sufficient to avoid the release exe-
cuted by plaintiff in favor of defendants. 
Defendants' answer (Tr. 10-11, Ab. 8) set up a 
rPlPase by plaintiff in favor of defendants of all claims 
growing out of the incident referred to. The release 
(defendant:-;' Pxhibit 1) is as follows: 
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'·'RELEASE 
''For the sole consideration of TWENTY 
($20.00) and NOjlOOth DOLLARS and other val-
uable considerations, the receipt of which is here-
by acknowledged, I do hereby release and for-
ever discharge the Salt Lake Transportation Com-
pany, the Green Cab Transportation Company 
and Louis Bartley, Cab Driver, from all claims, 
demands and rights of action of any kind whatso-
ever, which I now have or can have on account of 
injury to person or damage to property or ex-
penses or loss of services sustained by me, or 
which may hereafter arise, in consequence of an 
accident which occurred on or about the tenth 
day of February, 1940, at the intersection of South 
Temple and First Vvest Streets, Salt Lake City, 
Utah. 
"It is agreed that the payment of the above 
sum and other valuable considerations is not to be 
construed as an admission by or on behalf of the 
above named parties of any liability on account 
of said accident. 
"Executed at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 21st 
day of February, 1940. 
1fRs. CLARABELL UTLEY KELLEY ( Sgd.) 
MRS. !L w. ALLRED ( Sgd.) 
Witness." 
Plaintiff in reply (Tr. 12-13, Ab. 10-11) admits the 
execution and delivery of the release, but alleges that it 
was procured from her by misrepresentation and denies 
that she is bound thereby. The misrepresentations re-
lied upon are as follows (Tr. 12, Ab. 10): 
(a) That agents of the defendant stated to the 
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plaintiff that she would never be able to recover any 
damage against defendants by reason of her injuries; 
(b) That unless she signed the release they would 
pay her no sum or sums for her injuries ; 
(c) That defendants would not pay plaintiff's doc-
tor bill, nor any further expense of any kind, unless she 
signed the release. 
There is a further allegation (Tr. 13, Ab. 11) that 
plaintiff did not know ·what she was signing. We shall 
comment upon this point infra. 
This release was admitted as evidence upon defend-
ants' cross-examination of plaintiff (Tr. 62, Ab. 17), 
and was a part of the record at the time defendants' mo-
tion for new trial (Tr. 79, Ab. 22) was made. 
We shall discuss the adequacy of plain tiff's reply 
to avoid the effect. of this release, and follow with a re-
view of the evidence touching its execution and delivery. 
Bancroft, in his work on code pleadings, Vol. 4, at 
page 3989, gives the rule with respect to pleading avoid-
ance of a release as follows: 
"* * * As in other cases in pleading that a 
release was obtained by fraud, the facts constitut-
ing the alleged fraud must be specifically averred, 
and a mere general averment of fraud by way of 
conclusion is insufficient. The existence of all of 
the essential elements of actionable fraud mu-st be 
slwu.'n so the representations pleaded must be as 
to matters of fact as distinguished from mere ex-
pressions of opinion." (Italics onrs.) 
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In 53, C. J. 1219, Sec. 35, it is pointed out that there 
is no reason why a release should he invalidated for 
fraudulent representation, except for the same reasons 
for which any other written instrument would be, and 
that for a releasor to avoid a release on the ground of 
fraud, he must show (and of course he must plead to en-
able him to so show) in addition to the fact of a false 
representation, that such representation was as to a ma-
terial matter, that it was made with knowledge of its 
falsity, or with reckless regard for the truth, that it was 
made with the intention that it should be acted upon by 
the releasor to whom it was made, that the releasor had 
a right to rely on it, and that he did act in reliance upon 
such representations to his damage or injury. 
The rule is also laid down repeatedly in the authori-
ties (see 53 C. J. 1221), that a mere expression of opin-
ion as distinguished from a statement of fact, will not 
be sufficient to avoid a release on the ground of fraud 
or false representation, unless falsely given, not being 
actually held by the person making the representation. 
Thus, it has been held that statements by the releasee's 
adjustor as to how long litigation might be protracted 
are mere expressions of opinion, Kilby v. Charles City 
Western Ry. Co., 191 Iowa 926, 183 N. lV. 371. 
A statement by releasee's claim agent that if there-
leasor won at the trial his counsel would keep all the 
money is the expression of an opinion, and not a repre-
sentation of fact, Costello v. Hayes, 249 Mass. 349, 144 
N. E. 368. 
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In the absence of confidential or fiduciary relations 
between the parties, and unless it is made without a be-
lief in its truth on the part of the person making it, a 
false representation of law does not vitiate a release, 
ralley v. Boston, etc., Railway Company (Maine), 68 
Atl. 635, or the opinion of the releasee's attorney that the 
releasor could not recover for his injuries, Algood t;, 
Tarkio Electric etc. Co. (J!o.), 6 B. W. 2d 51; Denver etc. 
Ry. Co. v. Sullivan (Colo), 41 Pac. 501; Aetna Ins. Com-
pany v. Reed, 33 Ohio State 283. If the plaintiff had, as 
she contended, already consulted her attorney about the 
matter, she is thereby also effectively concluded, Kilby v. 
Charles City Trestern Ry. Co., 191 lou·a 926, 183 N. W. 
371. 
Plaintiff's reply pleads that certain representations 
were made. The representations all relate to matters 
of opinion or of law. There is no allegation anywhere in 
the reply that the representations were false, nor that 
they were known to be false by the persons making the 
representations, nor that they ·were made with the in-
tention that the plaintiff should act upon then1. Cer-
tainly the statement made to the plaintiff that unless she 
signed the release she would receive no sum whatsoever, 
nor would her existing and future doctor bills be paid, 
was not false, and forms no basis for avoidance of the 
release. If that were so, no compromise would be pos-
sible; cmnpromises are almost ahvays based upon a dis-
puted question of liability. 
No confidential relation between plaintiff and the 
defendants is pleaded, nor did any in fact exist. Plaintiff 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
24 
had her own independent advice. There is no pleading 
of duress, nor was it present in fact. The settlement took 
place 11 days after the injury, and at a time, according 
to all the physicians' evidence, when the plaintiff was 
suffering only mildly, if at all, and in the presence of 
her brother, and a considerable interval elasped between 
the discussion and the presentation of the release, dur-
ing which interval she could have consulted her brother, 
or her attorney, or have changed her mind without any 
consultation. 
The allegation that plaintiff signed the release with-
out knowing what she was signing is not supported by 
any evidence, and in view of the fact that she was not 
hurried or rushed in any way, and that the release con-
forms to the verbal understanding had prior to its execu-
tion, and that she is presumed to know the contents of 
what she signed, such defense would not be available to 
her in any event. 
The evidence does not support any case of fraud in 
the procurement of the release. 
Mrs. Kelley testified (Tr. '61, Ab. 17) that the signa-
ture "Clarabell Utley Kelley" on defendants' exhibit 
1 (the release), (Tr. 61, Ab. 17), is her signature. 
"Q. And you signed that? 
"A. Yes, sir. 
'' Q. In the presence of Mrs. l\L \V. Allred?'' 
''A. Yes. 
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''Q. On the 21st day of February, 19401 
''A. Yes. 
"'Q. ~\nd you received at that time $20.00 (Tr. 62, 
Ab. 17). 
''A. Yes." 
On redirect examination (Tr. 63, Ab. 17) Mrs. Kelley 
testified that it was a week or longer after the injury 
when ~Ir. Boynton and the other gentlemen came out to 
her house; that her back was hurting her, and she was 
nervous; that :Jir. Boynton and the other gentlemen told 
her they would allow her $20.00 for help (Tr. 64, Ab. 
13); that she told them she thought she was entitled to 
more than that, at least for her injuries, and that they 
told her she \Yas not, that $20.00 was all she would get, 
and that if she didn't take that, she would get nothing 
at all; that they asked her if she had employed an attor-
ney, and she said: "\Yell, they (apparently the plain-
tiff and her advisors) had discussed an attorney.'' That 
she signed the release because she was in need of medical 
attention, and they told her she ·wouldn't get any more 
medical attention unless she signed it. 
'' Q. And so you signed this document upon that 
representation 1 
''A. Yes, sir.'' 
She further testified (Tr. 66, Ab. 18) that after 
signing the release and taking the $20.00, she got in touch 
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with her attorney, and caused him to return the $20.00 
and to write a letter attempting to repudiate the release. 
It further appears that the $20.00 was paid to her in 
cash, that the tendered return was by check, and that 
the check has been re-tendered to the plaintiff. She fur-
ther testified (Tr. 70, Ab. 19) that her brother, a man 
of 49 years of age, was with her when the settlement was 
agreed upon, and that he approved of the settlement; that 
the conversation relating to settlement was had during 
the daytime with Mr. Boynton and the other gentleman, 
and that a third gentleman, Mr. Clyde Day, came out 
with the release and the money later on the same day. 
(Tr. 71, Ab. 19.) 
Mrs. Kelley testified (Tr. 98, A b. 25) that at the 
time settlement was discussed with Mr. Boynton and the 
other gentleman at her home, she had a telephone and 
could have had her brother telephone Mr. Shields if she 
had wished to. 
Witness Boynton testified (Tr. 117, Ab. 29) that on 
the day the release was signed, Mr. Utley, the plaintiff's 
brother, called him; that pursuant to that call, he and 
Harold S. Jennings went to the residence of Mrs. Kelley, 
and that Mr. Utley was there; that Mrs. Kelley was still 
in bed (Tr. 118, Ab. 30); that a conversation was had 
with Mrs. Kelley in the presence of ~1:r. Utley; that 1\{rs. 
Kelley consulted Mr. Utley as to ·what she should do, and 
he expressed an opinion that he thought she should agree 
to take what was offered. Mr. Boynton told Mrs. Kelley 
that the defendants would pay her expenses for the help 
she had had, and that they would pay all the doctor bills 
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that she had so far incurred, and that th0y would fur-
ther pay doctor bills so long as she was under the treat-
ment of Dr. Spencer Wright, if she would go to him 
and take treatments until he released her (Tr. 119, Ab. 
30): that she said, "well, all right," and signed the re-
lease later on the san1e day; that the $20.00 was paid 
her to royer the expense of household help. That (Tr. 
120, Ab. 30) the $20.00 'Yas in currency and the defend-
ants later received back a cashier's check in connection 
"·ith the letter marked plaintiff's Exhibit A; that they 
did not accept the return of that money, and have tend-
ered it back for the benefit of plaintiff; that (Tr. 121, 
Ab. 30) the plaintiff did not mention Mr. Shields. 1\ir. 
Boynton expressed the idea that the defendants' driver 
had used due care and that the defendants were not liable 
for any claim which she might present. 
On cross-examination (Tr. 121, Ab. 30) :Mr. Boynton 
testified that he took Mr. Jennings along with him so he 
would be present at any conversation that was had; that 
he did not consider the defendants liable at all (Tr. 123, 
Ab. 31) but they were interested in talking settlement 
to avoid legal expense; that (Tr. 126) Mrs. ICelley said 
she thought she ought to have something for her injuries, 
but defendants told her they didn't consider themselves 
liable for anything, and when they told her that defend-
ants would continue to pay for the doctor's expense, thai 
was conditioned upon her signing the release. 
Clyde I-I. Day testified (Tr. 132, Ab. 33) that he is 
employed by Salt Lake Transportation Company; that on 
f1e 21st of February, 1940, he was asked by ~[ r. Boyn-
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ton to deliver a release and $20.00 to Mrs. Kelley, which 
he did about 10 o'clock on tlie date the release was signed; 
that the release was signed in his presence and in the 
presence of Mrs. Allred, the witness thereto, and (Tr. 
133, A b. 33) he left $20.00 with Mrs. Kelley; that he was 
met at the door of Mrs. Kelley's residence by Mrs. All-
red, who ushered him into the bedroom, where he found 
Mrs. Kelley propped up in bed reading a book. He told 
her he had brought the release to be signed, and she said, 
"Well, that is the terms Mr. Boynton and I agreed upon. 
\Ve thought it best to agree upon a settlement * * *" 
and at that time she signed the release, and he took it 
back to the office. 
On cross-examination (Tr. 134, Ab. 33) Mr. Day tes-
tified that Mrs. Kelley read the release ; that she looked 
at it at least three or four minutes before she signed it; 
that l\frs. Allred, the witness, signed the release in the 
bedroom at the time Mrs. Kelley signed it. 
There are cases which hold that grossly inadequate 
consideration may in itself raise a presumption of fraud. 
Inadequacy of consideration is not pleaded in this case, 
nor under the evidence did it in fact exist. The consid-
eration which plaintiff was to receive was the $20.00 cash, 
payment in full for all medical services theretofore rend-
ered her, and she was to continue going to Dr. Wright 
and receiving treatment at defendant's expense until Dr. 
Wright released her. It does not appear that the verdic1·. 
rendered in her favor by the jury would have netted her 
any substantial amount in addition to the consideration 
for the release. 
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This case is presented to the Court more for the pur-
pose of determining whether compromises and releases 
are to be upheld, or whether they shall be set aside on 
some slight provocation rather than because of any ex-
cess verdict. It is defendants' ·dew that compromise and 
release of doubtful claims for personal injury is highly 
favored by the law, and that any contract by which there 
is a fair meeting of the minds of the parties to that end 
should be upheld by the courts. If there was a meeting 
of the minds of the parties '"ithout fraud or unfair con-
duct, the contract should stand, although subsequent 
events might show that either party made a bad bar-
gain. Such compromises cannot be avoided for a mistake 
of fact, nor can the releasor avoid the effect of her agree-
ment on the ground that at the time she signed the paper, 
she did not read it, or know its contents. The only fraud 
which may be availed of in an action at law to avoid a 
formally executed release of the claim sued on is mate-
rial misrepresentation or deceit or trickery practiced 
to induce the execution of a release which the signer 
never intended to execute, and on which the minds of the 
contracting parties never met. 
3. The Court erred in giving its Instruction No. 2. 
and in refusing to give defendants' requested 
Instructions :Nos. 2. 3. 5, and 6. 
(a) ERROR IN IKSTRUCTIO~~ GIVEX 
In~truction No. 2 as given by the Court is as follows 
(rrr. 144, A h. 35) : 
''The other question is as to whether the re-
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lease is binding upon the plaintiff. There is some 
dispute in the testimony as to the circumstances 
under which that release was procured. A release 
should be voluntary, and with a full knowledge 
of all of the facts. So, you are instructed that it 
is claimed by the plaintiff that she was induced 
to sign said release by statements made by the 
persons who procured the smne, as shown by the 
instructions of the Court. You are therefore in-
structed that if you find from the ·evidence that 
the officers of said companies went to the home 
of said plaintiff and there stated and represented 
to her that they had made an investigation of said 
accident, and that it was a non-liability case; that 
if plaintiff brought an action to recover damages 
she could not prevail because there was no lia-
bility on the part of the company on account of 
said accident, and that the payment of twenty dol-
lars, which they were offering her, was a mere 
gratuity, a customary gesture of good will in non-
liability cases, and that if she were to bring a suit 
against the defendants she could not recover any 
damages, and sajd offer would be withdrawn, and 
if you further believe from the evidence that the 
plaintiff was at the time suffering from pain and 
distress by reason of her injury, and was in need 
of medical care, and it was represented to her by 
the officers of said defendant companies who pro-
cured said release, that unless she signed the re-
lease they would not furnish her with additional 
medical care and attention, and if you further be-
lieve that plaintiff relied upon such statements, 
and believed them to be true, and that the plain-
tiff had no money with which to employ physicians 
for her medical care and attention, then I instruct 
you that said release would not be bindina- upon 
plaintiff and you should disregard the sa~e, and 
should award her such damages, if any, that you 
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1nay find she is entitled to by rPason of her in-
juries, not ('XePt•ding, howPYt:r, the sum of one 
thousand and fifty dollars, o:w thousand dollar~ 
general damages, and thirty-five dollars doctor 
bill.'' 
It ·was duly excepted to (Tr. 14, Ab. 42). The vices 
of this instruction are as follows: 
( 1) EYen if there had been any evidence upon 
which the jury could have concluded that the represen-
tations referred to in the instruction were made and 
were the procuring cause of the release, the representa-
tions referred to were not sufficient, as a matter of law, 
to avoid the release. \Y e have expressed our views on 
this matter under point No. 2, supra, and will not repeat 
them here. The Court, it will be noted (Tr. 145), in-
structed the jury that the release is not binding upon 
plaintiff if these presentations were made. We think 
think that neither the law nor the evidence justifies such 
an instruction. 
(2) A further provision of the instruction reads: 
'' * * * A release should be voluntary, and 
with a full knowledge of all of the facts. So, you 
are instructed that it is claimed by the plaintiff 
that she was induced to sign said release by state-
ments made by the persons who procured the 
same, as shown by the instructions of the Court.'' 
There was no evidence to support such an instruc-
tion. All the evidence of the plaintiff, as well as that of 
the defendants, shows that the release was voluntary, 
and with a full knowledge of the facts. There were dif-
ferences of opinion as to the law applicable to the facts, 
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that is to say, whether the plaintiff could or could not 
recover in an action. The only other representation actu-
ally complained of was the statement that the defendants 
would pay her nothing and authorize no further medical 
service unless she signed the release. That was a mere 
expression of intention, and is not an actionable repre-
sentation. The last clause of this instruction, "as shown 
by the instructions of the court,'' is misleading because 
there were no other instructions relating to the release, 
or the circumstances under which it was given. 
(3) There are other material matters in this in-
struction which are not supported by the evidence. For 
instance: 
"* * * You are therefore instructed that if 
you find from the evidence that the officers of said 
companies went to the home of said plaintiff and 
there stated and represented to her that they had 
made an investigation of said accident, and that 
it was a non-liability case; * * * '' 
Now here in the evidence can we find any such state-
ment or representation as this. It is not claimed by 
the plaintiff in her testimony; there is no evidence for 
its support. 
( 4) Again, (Tr. 144): 
"* * * that the payment of twenty dollars, 
which they were offering her, was a mere gratuity, 
a customary gesture of good will in non-liability 
cases. * * *'' 
there is no evidence to support this portion of the in-
struction. Certainly the plaintiff did not testify to it. 
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J.Ir. Boynton testified (Tr. 26, ...:\.-b. 31) that he told her 
that the defendants did not feel that they were liable for 
anything, but they were willing to pay her the expense 
she had been put to, and authorize the medical service 
to save legal expense (Tr. 123, Ab. 31). There is no evi-
dence anywhere in the record that it was a ''customary 
gesture of good wHl," or a "mere gratuity." 
( 5) The Court further instructed the jury that: 
* * * if you further believe from the evidence 
that the plaintiff was at the time suffering from 
pain and distress by reason of her injury, and 
was in need of medical care, and it was represent-
ed to her by the officers of said defendant com-
panies who procured said release, that unless she 
signed the release they would not furnish her with 
additional medical care and attention, and if you 
further believe that plaintiff relied upon such 
statements, and believed them to be true, and that 
the plaintiff had no money with which to employ 
pl1ysicians for her medical care and attention, 
then I instruct you that said release would not be 
binding.* * *" 
This portion of the instructions bears an aspect of 
duress, but no such influence was pleaded, and certainly 
it did not exist. Ten days had elapsed since the accident, 
during all of which time the plaintiff had had independ-
ent advice, including, according to her own statement, 
consultation with an attorney, and moreover, after the 
adjustment was agreed upon, there was a considerable 
interval before the money and the release were brought 
to her, so the release could not be avoided upon that 
ground. Moreover, no necessity for medical treatment 
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existed at that time. The testimony of Dr. Anderson and 
Dr. Wright is conclusive upon this point. There was no 
basis either in the pleadings or in the evidence for such 
an instruction. The authorities agree that "it is error for 
the trial court to mis-state the evidence on a material 
point, even though the testimony is elsewhere correctly 
stated, and requested instructions mis-stating the evi-
dence are properly refused," 64 C. J. 709, and again, "In-
structions relating generally to evidence and matters of 
fact must be correct and not too broad o_r misleading.'' 
64 c. J. 705. 
(b) ERROR IN REFUSING INSTRUCTIONS 
(1) It was error to refuse defendants' requested 
Instruction No. 2 (Tr. 21, 22, Ab. 39, 40) because neither 
the pleadings nor the evidence presented a proper case 
for ignoring the release. This matter has been discussed 
under point No.1 supra. 
(2) Defendants' requested Instruction No. 3 (Tr. 
23, Ab. 23) reads as follows: 
"The Court instructs you that in this case the 
positions of the plaintiff and the defendants were 
at all times adverse; that no confidential or other 
fiduciary relationship existed between plaintiff 
and defendants, and that there vTas no duty upon 
the defendants to advise plajntiff to emplo:v an at-
torney or other1vise to tah:e counsel before exe-
cuting the release which she signed in this case.'' 
There was no pleading of a fiduciary relationship, 
and yet plaintiff has contended, apparently, that there 
was some duty on the part of the defendants to advise 
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her to employ an attorney. or to get outside, independent 
advice. and while there h;; evidence that she had inde-
pendent adYirP, both from her brother and elsewhere, 
it is defendants' YiPw that defendants stood in no confi-
dential relationship to her, and were under no duty to 
advise her in that regard. It was for this reason that the 
instruction was asked for. 'Ve think it should have been 
given. 
(3) Defendants' requested Instruction No. 5 is as 
follows: 
"The Court instructs you that if you find 
from the evidence that the plaintiff was a person 
of legal age, and that she signed the document in 
evidence freely and voluntarily, then the matter of 
consideration is not open for deliberation, as the 
plaintiff is bound by the consideration provided 
for in connection with the execution and delivery 
of the release.'' 
This request should have been granted, and this in-
struction given, because it is alleged in reply (Tr. 13, 
A b. 11) that the plain tiff signed the release ' 'without 
knowing the contents or purport of the same.'' 
She endeavored on the witness stand to show that at 
the time she signed the release she had not read it, and 
did not understand it. (Tr. 136.) This issue was raised by 
the pleadings, evidence and arguments, and there is no 
instruction relating thereto. It is material and a proper 
instruction was requested and should have been granted. 
(4) Defendants' requested Instruction No. 6 (Tr. 
140, Ab. 42) was as follows: 
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''The defendants request the Court to in-
struct the jury that if the jury finds that the de-
fendants did in fact state to the plaintiff that they 
were not liable, and she could not recover, then 
the jury should further determine whether such 
expression of opinion was honestly entertained 
and honestly made, and if the jury finds that such 
expressions of opinion were made and were hon-
estly entertained, then the Court instructs the 
jury that the expression of such opinion would 
not constitute misrepresentation, and that the re-
lease could not be avoided on that ground.'' 
If the expression that the defendants were not liable 
was made by the defendants' representatives to the 
plaintiff, nevertheless, if that opinion was honestly en-
tertained, it could not constitute actionable fraud or a 
ground for avoiding the release, 26 C. J. 1079-80-81; 
Nielsen v. Portland Gas & Coke Co. (Ore.), 147 Pac. 554; 
Davis v. Higgins (Okla.), 217 Pac. 193; Anderson v. 
J(ttrtz, 66 Colo. 215, 182 Pac. 533. The decision in the 
latter case refers to the earlier Colorado case of Kirk-
patrick v. Miller, 135 Pac. 780, in which it is held that all 
of the elements of actionable fraud, including the making 
of representations known to be false, must be pleaded and 
proved. 
CONCLUSION 
Compromise and settlement of controversies are fa-
vored by the law, and should not be interferred with for 
unsubstantial reasons. Clearly, a settlement should not 
be opened up where the question of liability is extremely 
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doubtful, and when the only attack upon the release is 
that it ·was procured by representations that the de-
fendants were not liable, and that unless the release was 
executed, they would make no payment to plaintiff. These 
representations were not false, and in any event, were 
not actionable. 
The right of parties to compose their differences, 
under circumstances such as those here disclosed, should 
be sustained. 
Respectfully submitted, 
INGEBRETSEN, RAY, RAWLINS 
& CHRISTENSEN, 
Attorneys for Defendants and 
Appellants. 
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